Simulated comparisons of resale housing sales brokerage patterns
ZHANG Hong1,2, ZHANG Yang3, LI Vera4, XU Zhao5
1. Hang Lung Center for Real Estate, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
2. Center for Urbanization and Industrial Development, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
3. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University, Beijing 100083, China;
4. Department of Accountancy, Hang Seng Management College, Hong Kong 999077, China;
5. Department of Construction and Real Estate, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
Abstract:The effects of resale housing sales brokerage patterns on buyer's utility were investigated by the buyer's utility for different brokerage patterns. Actual resale housing trading processes were used to develop mathematical models of the buyer's utility for "single broker" and "double broker" patterns. Matlab was then used to simulate the buyer's utility and related indexes. The findings show that the "single broker" pattern has smaller buyer to broker incentives than the "double broker" pattern, but the broker's search efforts and buyer's utility are bigger. From buyer's utility perspective, the buyer should select the "single broker" pattern to promote the resale housing trading process when all other variables are unchanged.
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