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清华大学学报(自然科学版)  2016, Vol. 56 Issue (8): 851-859    DOI: 10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2016.25.025
  建设管理 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
带回购条款的境外企业并购交易价格形成机制
龙大伟1,3, 黄红选2, 王梦月2, 杨永森3
1. 中国科学院大学 经济与管理学院, 北京 100049;
2. 清华大学 工业工程系, 北京 100084;
3. 诚志股份有限公司 北京管理总部, 北京 100084
Transaction prices of overseas mergers and acquisitions with a redemption provision
LONG Dawei1,3, HUANG Hongxuan2, WANG Mengyue2, YANG Yongsen3
1. School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;
2. Department of Industrial Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
3. Headquarters in Beijing, Chengzhi Shareholding Corporation, Ltd., Beijing 100084, China
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摘要 通过境外企业并购实现资源优化配置,是中国企业积极参与全球竞争的战略选择。该文对带回购条款的境外企业并购交易价格形成机制进行研究,分析了并购过程需要考虑的基本问题和关键环节,包括基于实物期权法、并购双方收益最大化和损失最小化原则,评估目标企业价值和交易价格区间;以并购效用最大化为目标,确定兼顾讨价还价能力和风险态度的交易价格标称值;在存在回购可能时,根据现值等价和效用等价策略,建立并购交易价格与回购概率的关系。此外,也讨论了并购交易均衡价格与讨价还价时间、出价顺序的关系。通过某A股上市公司并购境外生物能量公司的实证分析,验证了带回购条款的境外并购交易价格形成机制的可行性。该机制提供了关于目标企业价值评估及并购讨价还价的系统性定价方案。
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龙大伟
黄红选
王梦月
杨永森
关键词 境外企业并购资产定价交易价格回购条款讨价还价    
Abstract:Chinese enterprises are competing in the global business through overseas mergers and acquisitions. This paper studies a mechanism for asset pricing and transaction price formation which includes fundamental concerns and key phases related to redemption provisions. The process assesses the target enterprise value by the real option method, determines the transaction price interval, computes the nominal values via the utility maximization or bargaining models, and updates the asset purchasing price for the transaction with repurchase clauses. The present value and utility equivalency strategies are used to predict the transaction price formation. The effect of the redemption provision is described by a probability which is related to the transaction price. A case study shows the feasibility of this method for evaluating overseas mergers and acquisitions for an A-share company purchasing an overseas bioenergy life science company with the redemption provision. This is a comprehensive, integrated approach for evaluating the value of a firm and determining the purchase price through the bargaining between the buyer and the seller.
Key wordsoverseas merger and acquisition    asset pricing    transaction price    redemption provision    bargaining
收稿日期: 2016-03-08      出版日期: 2016-08-15
ZTFLH:  F271  
  F275  
  F276.7  
通讯作者: 杨永森,副教授,E-mail:yangyongsen@thcz.com.cn     E-mail: yangyongsen@thcz.com.cn
引用本文:   
龙大伟, 黄红选, 王梦月, 杨永森. 带回购条款的境外企业并购交易价格形成机制[J]. 清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2016, 56(8): 851-859.
LONG Dawei, HUANG Hongxuan, WANG Mengyue, YANG Yongsen. Transaction prices of overseas mergers and acquisitions with a redemption provision. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2016, 56(8): 851-859.
链接本文:  
http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2016.25.025  或          http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/Y2016/V56/I8/851
  表1 并购交易价格与回购概率(现值等价)
  表2 并购交易价格与回购概率(并购方效用等价)
  表3 并购交易价格与回购概率关系(目标企业效用等价)
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