DTA technique for JavaScript optimizing compilation mode
LIANG Bin1,2, GONG Weigang1,2, YOU Wei1,2, LI Zan1,2, SHI Wenchang1,2
1. Key Laboratory of Data Engineering and Knowledge Engineering(Renmin University of China) of Ministry of Education, Beijing 100872, China;
2. School of Information, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
Abstract：Mainstream JavaScript engines have introduced optimizing compilers. These compilers generate more efficient executable code for frequently functions run, but these optimizing compilers brings new challenges to the dynamic taint analysis (DTA) method implemented via dynamic instrumentation. This paper focuses on the HTML5-based hybrid android App and presents a dynamic taint analysis method for the optimizing compilers in the V8 JavaScript engine using dynamic instrumentation. In this method, the taint box object is used to store the taint tags and the taint tracking code is instrumented at the hydrogen level of the optimizing compiler. Tests show that this dynamic taint analysis technique effectively tracks the taint information flow in the optimizing compiler with acceptable performance overhead.
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2017, Vol. 57 
