Abstract：Surety companies always face the problem that the guaranteed amount per bond or the guaranteed balance often exceeds its limit. Surety companies then need surety reinsurance but such policies still lack operational guidance on the use of surety reinsurance in China. This paper presents the surety reinsurance system as a competitive surety reinsurance platform and introduces an auction mechanism for the reinsurance operations to increase the reinsurance efficiency and competitiveness and promote market-oriented reinsurance premiums. Then, a surety reinsurance game model is developed based on a multi-attribute reverse auction with a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy. Its three bidding attributes for the candidate reinsurer include the total reinsurance expense, the underwriting risk and the credit rating from the credit reporting system. A Monte Carlo simulation is then used to simulate the model and analyze the trends of the total score and the sub-attribute scores of the winning candidate for various numbers of candidates. The simulation results agree well with real data.
薛彦广, 邓晓梅, 苏贵良. 基于多属性逆向拍卖的工程担保分保竞拍[J]. 清华大学学报（自然科学版）, 2018, 58(9): 841-848.
XUE Yanguang, DENG Xiaomei, SU Guiliang. Reinsurance auction for surety bonds based on multi-attribute reverse auctions. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2018, 58(9): 841-848.
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2018, Vol. 58 
