Dynamic key management with individual key revocation for TPM
YU Fajiang, CHEN Yuchi, ZHANG Huanguo
Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing of Ministry of Education, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
Abstract：The trusted platform module (TPM) has limited internal memory, so most keys must be saved outside the TPM and such systems require a mechanism to revoke individual keys saved outside the module. A dynamic key management mechanism with a dynamic key management tree and a chameleon hash function was developed to store application keys in leaf nodes. TPM then uses a secret key to append new keys and update or revoke old keys without modifying any other keys. Only the leftmost node of each level in the tree is stored inside the TPM with the others all stored outside. When updating or revoking an old key, TPM traverses all the nodes on the path from the corresponding leaf node to the node stored inside the TPM. The required internal memory size for key updates or revocation with this scheme is a logarithmic function of the total number of keys, which is much more efficient than previous schemes. This dynamic key management mechanism is compatible with existing applications and can be adapted to any embedded crypto-module.
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2020, Vol. 60 
