Abstract：Cache attacks are a new type of side channel attack which pose a great threat to current security protection. This paper presents a method to effectively detect and locate Cache side channel attacks based on performance analyses of Cache side channel attack loop positioning. The analyses are divided into attack detection and attack loop positioning. In the attack detection phase, the hardware performance counter is used to detect whether a binary program is a Cache side channel attack program. The attack loop positioning phase then locates the attack loop, samples the performance events, and then identifies the internal structure of the binary program loop and function with the findings combined with sampling data to locate the attack loop. Finally, several typical Cache side channel attacks and benign programs are analyzed to show that this method can accurately distinguish between attack programs and benign programs. Comparison of the positioning results with the attack source code shows that the method can accurately locate the attack loop.
彭双和, 赵佳利, 韩静. 基于性能分析的Cache侧信道攻击循环定位[J]. 清华大学学报（自然科学版）, 2020, 60(6): 449-455.
PENG Shuanghe, ZHAO Jiali, HAN Jing. Loop pinpoints of Cache side channel attacks from a performance analysis. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2020, 60(6): 449-455.
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2020, Vol. 60 
