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清华大学学报(自然科学版)  2015, Vol. 55 Issue (9): 1017-1022    
  环境科学与工程 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
基于效用理论的气候谈判博弈策略模型
王灿1,2, 金朱钢1,2, 蔡闻佳2
1. 清华大学 环境学院, 北京 100084;
2. 清华大学 地球系统科学研究中心, 北京 100084
Strategic game model for climate change negotiations based on utility theory
WANG Can1,2, JIN Zhugang1,2, CAI Wenjia2
1. School of Environment, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
2. Center for Earth System Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
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摘要 基于效用理论, 从博弈视角模拟气候谈判框架下各国谈判策略。首先识别气候变化投资对各国效用的正向、 负向和外溢效应; 其次在增温幅度、温度对GDP(国内生产总值)增速影响等不确定性下求得各国静态博弈对策; 最后通过动态化博弈行为, 对气候谈判中先动劣势的存在性提出检验方法。典型案例模拟结果表明: 气候谈判策略的确存在先动劣势, 各国倾向于等待并迫使别国先做出减排承诺, 该博弈分析印证了气候谈判现状。
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王灿
金朱钢
蔡闻佳
关键词 气候谈判效用理论博弈策略模型    
Abstract:A game theory model incorporating utility theory was used to analyze climate change strategies for different countries. The model includes the positive, negative and spillover effects of climate change related investments, temperature change uncertainties and their effects on GDP (gross domestic product) growth. The strategies are dynamic to test for the existence of the first-mover disadvantage. The first-mover disadvantage hypothesis is also confirmed by a typical real case. The strategic model indicates that each country should wait and urge others to make promises in advance, as has been seen in real negotiations.
Key wordsclimate change negotiations    utility theory    game theory    strategic model
收稿日期: 2013-01-25      出版日期: 2015-11-09
ZTFLH:  F224  
  X24  
引用本文:   
王灿, 金朱钢, 蔡闻佳. 基于效用理论的气候谈判博弈策略模型[J]. 清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2015, 55(9): 1017-1022.
WANG Can, JIN Zhugang, CAI Wenjia. Strategic game model for climate change negotiations based on utility theory. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2015, 55(9): 1017-1022.
链接本文:  
http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/  或          http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/Y2015/V55/I9/1017
  图1 基于效用的博弈策略模型流程图
  表1 不同策略下的动态博弈均衡
  表2 某2国模型的初始参数设定
  表3 某2国模型博弈策略模拟结果
  表4 博弈策略模型敏感性测试
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