Abstract：A game theory model incorporating utility theory was used to analyze climate change strategies for different countries. The model includes the positive, negative and spillover effects of climate change related investments, temperature change uncertainties and their effects on GDP (gross domestic product) growth. The strategies are dynamic to test for the existence of the first-mover disadvantage. The first-mover disadvantage hypothesis is also confirmed by a typical real case. The strategic model indicates that each country should wait and urge others to make promises in advance, as has been seen in real negotiations.
王灿, 金朱钢, 蔡闻佳. 基于效用理论的气候谈判博弈策略模型[J]. 清华大学学报（自然科学版）, 2015, 55(9): 1017-1022.
WANG Can, JIN Zhugang, CAI Wenjia. Strategic game model for climate change negotiations based on utility theory. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2015, 55(9): 1017-1022.
 Desombre E R. Global warming: More common than tragic [J]. Ethics and International Affairs, 2004, 18: 41-46.
 Chander P, Tulkens H. The Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and beyond: An economic and game theoretical exploration and interpretation [Z/OL]. (2013-01-20),http://ns6.ucl.ac.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2011_51web.pdf.
 Wood P J. Climate change and game theory [J]. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2011, 1219(1): 153-170.
 Mason C F, Polasky S, Tarui N. Cooperation on climate-change mitigation [R]. Laramie,USA:University of Wyoming,2011
 Heitzig J, Lessmann K, Zou Y. Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games [J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2011, 108(38): 15739-15744.
 Asheim G B, Froyn C B, Hovi J, et al. Regional versus global cooperation for climate control [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2006, 51(1): 93-109.
 Ostrom E. Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change [J]. Global Environmental Change, 2010, 20(4): 550-557.
 张发树,何建坤,刘滨,等. 基于博弈的技术转移与清洁发展机制捆绑 [J]. 清华大学学报: 自然科学版, 2010, 50(9): 1460-1463.ZHANG Fashu, HE Jiankun, LIU Bin, et al. Issue tying-in of technology transfers and clean development mechanism using game model [J]. Journal of Tsinghua University: Science and Technology, 2010, 50(9): 1460-1463. (in Chinese)
 欧训民,张希良,王若水. 低碳技术国际转移双层多主体博弈模型 [J]. 清华大学学报: 自然科学版, 2012, 52(2): 234-237. OU Xunmin, ZHANG Xiliang, WANG Ruoshui. Dual-level multi-player game-theory model for low-carbon international technology transfer [J]. Journal of Tsinghua University: Science and Technology, 2012, 52(2): 234-237. (in Chinese)
 金朱钢, 蔡闻佳, 王灿. 基于博弈模型的中美气候谈判策略模拟 [J]. 气候变化研究进展, 2013, 9(5): 350-356.JIN Zhugang, CAI Wenjia, WANG Can. Simulation of climate negotiation strategies between China and the US based on game theory [J]. Advances in Climate Change Research, 2013, 9(5): 350-356. (in Chinese)
 Quiggin J. A theory of anticipated utility [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1982, 3(4): 323-343.
 Pindyck R S. Uncertain outcomes and climate change policy [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2012, 63(3): 289-303.
 Dell M, Jones B F, Olken B A. Temperature and income: Reconciling new cross-sectional and panel estimates [J]. American Economic Review, 2009, 99(5): 198-204
 Weitzman M. Additive damages, fat-tailed climate dynamics, and uncertain discounting [J]. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 2009, 3:9-18.
 Jaeger C, Paroussos L, Mangalagiu D, et al. A new growth path for Europe: Generating prosperity and jobs in the low-carbon economy [Z/OL]. (2013-01-20),http://www.newgrowthpath.eu/ .
 Aumann R J. Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 8(1): 6-19.
 Dasgupta P. The Stern Review's economics of climate change [J]. National Institute Economic Review, 2007, 199: 4-70.
 Stern N H, Britain G. Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change [M]. London, UK: HM Treasury, 2006.