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清华大学学报(自然科学版)  2019, Vol. 59 Issue (11): 940-952    DOI: 10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2019.22.035
  经济管理 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
财政分权及财政压力冲击下的地方政府收支行为
张原1, 吴斌珍1,2
1. 清华大学 经济管理学院, 北京 100084;
2. 清华大学 财政税收研究所, 北京 100084
Fiscal decentralization, fiscal squeeze and local government revenue and expenditure restructuring
ZHANG Yuan1, WU Binzhen1,2
1. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
2. National Institute for Fiscal Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
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摘要 该文利用2002年中国所得税收入分享改革这一政策变化来考察财政分权及其带来的财政压力如何影响地方政府财政收支行为,测算外生所得税分享政策造成的地市级政府的收入损失,使用双重差分法分析财政压力下地市级政府财政收支结构的变化。研究发现:财政压力增大时,地市级政府可以通过多种收入政策工具的调整来勉强维持本级财力及一般公共预算支出的增长;收入支出的结构会发生变化,收入损失越大,地市级政府非所得税税收收入的征税力度及基金收入征税力度提高越多;同时,财政支出上倾向增加基建支出。
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张原
吴斌珍
关键词 地方财政财政压力财政支出税收分成    
Abstract:This study investigates how local governments restructure their revenue and expenditure in response to fiscal stress resulting from changes in fiscal decentralization. The exogenous policy shock of income tax sharing in 2002 is analyzed using the difference-in-difference method to solve the endogeneity problem. The results show that prefectural governments faced with increasing fiscal stresses tend to maintain their revenue and expenditure levels by various revenue tools but they change their expenditure structures. Prefectural governments with larger income losses increase their reliance on non-income taxes and government funds and prefer to increase their infrastructure expenditures.
Key wordslocal finance    fiscal squeeze    expenditure    tax sharing
收稿日期: 2019-04-08      出版日期: 2019-11-19
基金资助:吴斌珍,副教授,E-mail:wubzh@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn
引用本文:   
张原, 吴斌珍. 财政分权及财政压力冲击下的地方政府收支行为[J]. 清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2019, 59(11): 940-952.
ZHANG Yuan, WU Binzhen. Fiscal decentralization, fiscal squeeze and local government revenue and expenditure restructuring. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2019, 59(11): 940-952.
链接本文:  
http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2019.22.035  或          http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/Y2019/V59/I11/940
  表1 财政压力构造方法
  表2 关键变量描述性分析
  图1 1998—2005年不同财政压力地区的 非所得税税收收入/GDP的变化
  图2 1999—2005年不同财政压力地区的 所得税收入/GDP增速的变化
  图3 1999—2005年不同财政压力地区的 总税收收入/GDP增速的变化
  表3 财政压力对非所得税税收收入/GDP的影响
  表4 财政压力对所得税收入/GDP增速、总税收收入/GDP增速的影响
  表5 财政压力对政府性基金收入/GDP的影响
  图5 所得税收入/GDP增速、总税收 收入/GDP增速的事件研究
  图4 非所得税税收收入/GDP的事件研究
  表6 财政压力对总支出/GDP增速的影响
  表7 财政压力对支出结构的影响
  图7 分类支出/GDP的事件研究
  图6 总支出/GDP增速的事件研究
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