Stabilizing land price, local government land supply, and land transaction prices and volumes
WU Shuping1, ZHANG Li2, YANG Zan3
1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China; 2. International School of Business and Finance, Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai 519082, China; 3. Department of Construction Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
Abstract：Prefecture-level panel data of successful and unsuccessful residential land auctions from 2007 to 2017 was analyzed to examine the influences of "stabilizing land price" regulations on the residential land supply volume, land transaction rate, land price premium rate, and land sale prices. Regulatory pressures have caused local governments to significantly increase the planned residential land supply, especially in low-administrative level cities or cities that have just experienced a change in mayor. However, the regulatory policies did not lower the price expectations of land use companies for residential land and, therefore, did not significantly reduce the residential land transaction rate, premium rate, or transaction price. In the end, the "stabilizing land price" regulations increased the number of residential land transactions and the land transfer income received by the local government but failed to achieve the goal of regulating land prices.
吴淑萍, 张莉, 杨赞. “稳地价”调控、地方政府土地供应与土地成交量价表现[J]. 清华大学学报（自然科学版）, 2022, 62(3): 601-613.
WU Shuping, ZHANG Li, YANG Zan. Stabilizing land price, local government land supply, and land transaction prices and volumes. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2022, 62(3): 601-613.
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2022, Vol. 62 
