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清华大学学报(自然科学版)  2016, Vol. 56 Issue (1): 14-21    DOI: 10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2016.23.013
  信息安全 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
工业控制系统场景指纹及异常检测
彭勇1,2, 向憧2, 张淼1, 陈冬青2, 高海辉2, 谢丰2, 戴忠华2
1. 北京邮电大学 信息安全中心, 北京 100876;
2. 中国信息安全测评中心, 北京 100085
Scenario fingerprint of an industrial control system and abnormally detection
PENG Yong1,2, XIANG Chong2, ZHANG Miao1, CHEN Dongqing2, GAO Haihui2, XIE Feng2, DAI Zhonghua2
1. Information Security Center, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China;
2. China Information Technology Security Evaluation Center, Beijing 100085, China
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摘要 工业控制系统(ICS)是监测和控制电力、水务、石油天然气、化工、交通运输、关键制造等国家关键基础设施行业物理过程运行的信息物理系统(CPS)。基于ICS系统中控制通信数据流的持续性和稳定性, 该文提出了从ICS系统工业控制协议交互模式中提取系统级行为特征来作为ICS场景指纹的创新思路和方法。ICS场景指纹不仅能用于识别特定ICS系统, 而且还能用于建立ICS系统正常行为基准并进一步用于识别系统的异常行为。该文构建了采用真实工控设备和软件以及仿真物理过程的实验系统并进行了相关实验验证测试。实验结果表明, ICS场景指纹是ICS系统安全研究方面的一种非常有前景的方法。
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彭勇
向憧
张淼
陈冬青
高海辉
谢丰
戴忠华
关键词 工业控制系统信息物理系统场景指纹异常检测    
Abstract:Industrial control systems (ICSs) are cyber-physical systems (CPSs) which supervise and control physical processes in critical infrastructure industries such as electric power, water treatment, oil & natural gas exploration, transportation, and chemical industry. Based on the observation of ICS'stable and persistent communication data flow control patterns, a concept and a methodology of ICS scenario fingerprinting were proposed which analyze industrial control protocol interactive behavior to represent ICS system-level normal behavior characteristics. ICS scenario fingerprint can identify unique ICS installation, while being used as a more generalized method to establish ICS systems'behavior benchmark and further being used to identify ICS systems'abnormal behavior. Experiments were made to validate the proposed viewpoint, which use real equipment for ICS cyber domain and use simulation for ICS physical domain. Experimental results demonstrate that ICS scenario fingerprinting technique provides ICS security research with a promising method.
Key wordsindustrial control system (ICS)    cyber-physical system (CPS)    scenario fingerprint    abnormally detection
收稿日期: 2014-10-28      出版日期: 2016-01-15
ZTFLH:  TP309  
引用本文:   
彭勇, 向憧, 张淼, 陈冬青, 高海辉, 谢丰, 戴忠华. 工业控制系统场景指纹及异常检测[J]. 清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2016, 56(1): 14-21.
PENG Yong, XIANG Chong, ZHANG Miao, CHEN Dongqing, GAO Haihui, XIE Feng, DAI Zhonghua. Scenario fingerprint of an industrial control system and abnormally detection. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2016, 56(1): 14-21.
链接本文:  
http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2016.23.013  或          http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/CN/Y2016/V56/I1/14
  图1 工业控制系统典型体系结构图
  图2 工控CSTR 场景实验拓扑图
  图3 CSTR 模型
  图4 工控系统场景指纹获取流程
  图5 获取的网络流量PCAP文件
  图6 HMI和PLC之间的TCP长连接
  表1 不同数量级的交互时差
  图7 不同时间尺度下的包向量数量
  表2 交易模式统计
  图8 CSTR 场景交易模式
  图9 ISO-on-TCP协议数据包
  图10 PLCScan扫描攻击数据流
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