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Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)    2019, Vol. 59 Issue (11) : 940-952     DOI: 10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2019.22.035
ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT |
Fiscal decentralization, fiscal squeeze and local government revenue and expenditure restructuring
ZHANG Yuan1, WU Binzhen1,2
1. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
2. National Institute for Fiscal Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
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Abstract  This study investigates how local governments restructure their revenue and expenditure in response to fiscal stress resulting from changes in fiscal decentralization. The exogenous policy shock of income tax sharing in 2002 is analyzed using the difference-in-difference method to solve the endogeneity problem. The results show that prefectural governments faced with increasing fiscal stresses tend to maintain their revenue and expenditure levels by various revenue tools but they change their expenditure structures. Prefectural governments with larger income losses increase their reliance on non-income taxes and government funds and prefer to increase their infrastructure expenditures.
Keywords local finance      fiscal squeeze      expenditure      tax sharing     
Issue Date: 19 November 2019
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ZHANG Yuan
WU Binzhen
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ZHANG Yuan,WU Binzhen. Fiscal decentralization, fiscal squeeze and local government revenue and expenditure restructuring[J]. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology), 2019, 59(11): 940-952.
URL:  
http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/EN/10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2019.22.035     OR     http://jst.tsinghuajournals.com/EN/Y2019/V59/I11/940
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
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