虚拟网络运营商（ISP）的出现改变了移动互联网市场中运营商之间的连接和经济关系。该文建立博弈模型，分别在合作情况下和非合作情况下，使用博弈理论分析了移动补贴市场中流量分配、运营商之间的定价关系及收益的变化，提出了一种在运营商之间分配收益的机制，并通过Nash讨价还价解的方法对收益分配因子进行了优化和求解。结果表明：运营商之间的定价随补贴的增加而升高，该文所提出的收益分配机制能促使运营商自发将其优化目标调整为社会福利最大化。
Abstract
The virtual Internet service providers (ISPs) have changed the connection and economic relationships among ISPs in mobile Internet sponsored markets. Game theory is used to develop a model to study the competition among ISPs and to analyze data allocation, pricing and utility issues for cooperative and non-cooperative games for ISPs in the mobile sponsored market. This paper also presents a revenue allocation mechanism and solves for the optimal allocation factor using the Nash bargaining solution. The results show that the price difference between ISPs increases with the sponsored level and the revenue allocation mechanism encourages the ISPs to adjust their optimized purposes to maximize the social welfare.
关键词
移动互联网 /
补贴市场 /
虚拟运营商 /
定价 /
收益分配
Key words
mobile Internet /
sponsored market /
virtual Internet service provider (ISP) /
pricing /
revenue allocation
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
参考文献
[1] HANDE P, CHIANG M, CALDERBANK R, et al. Network pricing and rate allocation with content provider participation[C]//Proceeding of 28th IEEE INFOCOM. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2009:990-998.[2] MA R T B, CHIU D M, LUI J C S, et al. On cooperative settlement between content, transit, and eyeball Internet service providers[J]. TON, 2011, 19(3):802-815.[3] BAILEY J P. The economics of Internet interconnection agreements[M]. Cambridge, USA:MIT Press, 1997.[4] HUSTON G. ISP Survival guide:Strategies for running a competitive ISP[M]. New York, USA:Wiley, 1999.[5] FARATIN P, CLARK D, GILMORE P, et al. Complexity of Internet interconnections:Technology, incentives and implications for policy[C]//Proceedings of the 35th Research Conference on Communication, Information andInternet Policy (TPRC). Arlington, USA, 2007:1-31.[6] MA R T B, CHIU D M, LUI J, et al. Internet economics:The use of Shapley value for ISP settlement[J]. TON, 2010, 18(3):775-787.[7] JOE-WONG C, HA S, CHIANG M. Sponsoring mobile data:An economic analysis of the impact on users and content providers[C]//Proceeding of IEEE INFOCOM 2015. Hong Kong, China, 2015:1499-1507.[8] ZHANG L, WU W, WANG D. Sponsored data plan:A two-class service model in wireless data networks[C]//Proceeding of ACM SIGMETRICS 2015. Portland, USA, 2015, 43(1):85-96.[9] ZHANG L, WU W, WANG D. Time dependent pricing in wireless data networks:Flat-rate vs. usage-based schemes[C]//Proceeding of IEEE INFOCOM 2014. Toronto, Canada, 2014:700-708.[10] MO J, WALRAND J. Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control[J]. TON, 2000, 8(5):556-567.[11] SU H. The proof process[OL/Z].[2017-06-21]. https://www.dropbox.com/s/wu8hkfj5b68s2xd//proof.pdf?dl=0.[12] NASH Jr J F. The bargaining problem[J]. Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society, 1950, 18(2):155-162.[13] BINMORE K, RUBINSTEIN A, WOLINSKY A. The Nash bargaining solution in economic modeling[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986, 17(2):176-188.
PDF(1056 KB)
