Pricing strategy and revenue allocation between service providers in mobile sponsored markets

SU Hui; TAN Qi; ZHAO Yi; XU Ke

doi:10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2018.22.002

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Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology) ›› 2018, Vol. 58 ›› Issue (1) : 8-13. DOI: 10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2018.22.002

COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Pricing strategy and revenue allocation between service providers in mobile sponsored markets

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Abstract

The virtual Internet service providers (ISPs) have changed the connection and economic relationships among ISPs in mobile Internet sponsored markets. Game theory is used to develop a model to study the competition among ISPs and to analyze data allocation, pricing and utility issues for cooperative and non-cooperative games for ISPs in the mobile sponsored market. This paper also presents a revenue allocation mechanism and solves for the optimal allocation factor using the Nash bargaining solution. The results show that the price difference between ISPs increases with the sponsored level and the revenue allocation mechanism encourages the ISPs to adjust their optimized purposes to maximize the social welfare.

Key words

mobile Internet / sponsored market / virtual Internet service provider (ISP) / pricing / revenue allocation

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SU Hui, TAN Qi, ZHAO Yi, XU Ke. Pricing strategy and revenue allocation between service providers in mobile sponsored markets[J]. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology). 2018, 58(1): 8-13 https://doi.org/10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2018.22.002

References

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