Incentive mechanism for construction projects based on the IPD philosophy

SU Guiliang; DENG Xiaomei; FENG Ke; XUE Yanguang

doi:10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2018.25.012

PDF(1414 KB)

Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology) ›› 2018, Vol. 58 ›› Issue (3) : 317-323. DOI: 10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2018.25.012

ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Incentive mechanism for construction projects based on the IPD philosophy

{{article.zuoZhe_EN}}

Author information +

History +

Abstract

A multi-party incentive model shows how the project characteristics, participant characteristics and incentive structure promote a project. The real effect of the participant cost, project optimization and incentive structure are illustrated through game simulations. The results show that the importance of the incentive model. High level of optimization potential, low team costs and the team members' cost variance contribute to the project success. The target cost setting, goal achievement compensation, and income distribution are critical project incentives.

Key words

integrated project delivery (IPD) / incentive mechanism / multi game model / game simulation

Cite this article

EndNote

Ris (Procite)

Bibtex

Download Citations

SU Guiliang, DENG Xiaomei, FENG Ke, XUE Yanguang. Incentive mechanism for construction projects based on the IPD philosophy[J]. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology). 2018, 58(3): 317-323 https://doi.org/10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2018.25.012

References

[1] LEVITT R E. CEM research for the next 50 years maximizing economic environmental and societal value of the built environment[J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2007, 133(9):619-628.
[2] 邓晓梅, 姜涌, 廖彬超, 等. 首席监造人制:建筑师负责制的中国化[J]. 中国勘察设计, 2016(4):56-63. DENG X M, JIANG Y, LIAO B C, et al. Chief supervisor of construction:The sinicization of architect responsibility system[J]. China Exploration & Design, 2016(4):56-63.(in Chinese).
[3] ASHCRAFT H W. Integrated project delivery:Optimizing project performance[EB/OL]. (2014-05). https://net-work.aia.org/home.
[4] WOOYONG J, BALLARD G, YONG-WOO K, et al. Understanding of target value design for integrated project delivery with the context of game theory[C]//Proceedings of the 2012 Construction Research Congress. West Lafayette, IN, USA:American Society of Civil Engineers, 2012:556-563.
[5] NANDA U, RYBKOWSKI Z K, PATI S, et al. A value analysis of lean processes in target value design and integrated project delivery:Stakeholder perception[J]. Herd-Health Environments Research & Design Journal, 2017, 10(3):99-115.
[6] 何清华, 刘晴. 集成项目交付(IPD)典型模式合同治理研究[J]. 建设监理, 2016(2):20-22, 54.HE Q H, LIU Q. Typical contract structure of integrated project delivery (IPD)[J]. Project Management, 2016(2):20-22, 54.(in Chinese)
[7] 马智亮, 马健坤. 消除建筑工程设计变更的定量激励机制[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版), 2016, 44(8):1280-1285.MA Z L, MA J K. A quantitative incentive mechanism to eliminate change orders in construction projects[J]. Journal of Tongji University (Natural Science), 2016, 44(8):1280-1285.(in Chinese).
[8] MATTHEWS O, HOWELL G A. Integrated project delivery an example of relational contracting[J]. Lean Construction Journal, 2005, 2(1):46-61.
[9] LIU M, BATES A J. Compensation structure and contingency allocation in integrated project delivery[C]//120th ASEE Annual Conference and Exposition. Atlanta, GA, USA:American Society for Engineering Education, 2013:6695.
[10] 李真, 孟庆峰, 盛昭瀚, 等. 工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012(3):112-121.LI Z, MENG Q F, SHENG Z H, et al. Evolution analysis of incentive efficiency of contractor group for engineering quality optimization[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012(3):112-121.(in Chinese).
[11] KENT D C, BECERIK-GERBER B. Understanding construction industry experience and attitudes toward integrated project delivery[J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2010, 136(8):815-825.
[12] AIA. Document C191^TM-2009:Standard form multi-party agreement for integrated project delivery[EB/OL]. (2009-03). http://www.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/aia/do-cuments/pdf/aiab081563.pdf.
[13] AIA. Integrated project delivery:A guide[EB/OL]. (2012-11). http://www.aiacc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/IPDeliveryGuide_final_revised.pdf.
[14] ASMAR M E, HANNA A S, LOH W Y. Quantifying performance for the integrated project delivery system as compared to established delivery systems[J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2013, 139(11):04013012.
[15] IPDA. Motivation and means:How and why IPD and lean lead to success[EB/OL]. (2016-11). http://www.ipda.ca/research-performance/case-studies/.
[16] AIA. IPD case studies[EB/OL]. (2012-3). http://rp.design.umn.edu/resources/documents/IPD-Case-Study-Mat-rix-2012_corrected02.pdf.
[17] PEPPER A, GOSLING T, GORE J. Fairness, envy, guilt and greed:Building equity considerations into agency theory[J]. Human Relations, 2015, 68(8):1291-1314.
[18] 唐文哲, 王腾飞, 孙洪昕, 等. 国际EPC水电项目设计激励机理[J]. 清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2016, 56(4):354-359.TANG W Z, WANG T F, SUN H X, et al. Game analysis of design incentives for delivering international hydropower EPC projects[J]. Journal of Tsinghua University (Science and Technology), 2016, 56(4):354-359.(in Chinese)
[19] HANNA A S. Benchmark performance metrics for integrated project delivery[J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2016, 142(9):04016040.