Attack detection and security state estimation of cyber-physical systems

GAO Yang; REN Wang; WU Renpu; WANG Weiping; YI Shengwei; HAN Baijing

doi:10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2021.21.008

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Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology) ›› 2021, Vol. 61 ›› Issue (11) : 1234-1239. DOI: 10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2021.21.008

VULNERABILITY ANALUSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT

Attack detection and security state estimation of cyber-physical systems

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Abstract

In the Industry 4.0 context, cyber-physical systems (CPS) need effective security and control capabilities. This study analyzes attack detection and security state estimation based on a cyber-physical system model attacked by an actuator. The attack detection uses a finite time attack detector that ensures that existing attacks can be accurately detected within a preset time limit. An observer is then designed to estimate the system state. A theoretical analysis shows that the observer ensures that the system can immediately adjust when attacked and that the system will reach a safe, stable state. Simulations verify the effectiveness of this method.

Key words

cyber-physical systems / abnormal state detection / safe state estimation / detector / observer

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GAO Yang, REN Wang, WU Renpu, WANG Weiping, YI Shengwei, HAN Baijing. Attack detection and security state estimation of cyber-physical systems[J]. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology). 2021, 61(11): 1234-1239 https://doi.org/10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2021.21.008

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