漏洞分析与风险评估

信息物理系统的攻击检测与安全状态估计

  • 高洋 ,
  • 任望 ,
  • 吴润浦 ,
  • 王卫苹 ,
  • 伊胜伟 ,
  • 韩白静
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  • 1. 中国信息安全测评中心, 北京 100085;
    2. 北京科技大学 计算机与通信工程学院, 北京 100083;
    3. 四川大学 电子信息学院, 成都 610065

收稿日期: 2020-07-09

  网络出版日期: 2021-10-19

基金资助

国家自然科学基金—联合基金项目(U1736117,U1736209);2018年工业互联网创新发展工程“工业互联网安全标准体系与试验验证环境建设”项目

Attack detection and security state estimation of cyber-physical systems

  • GAO Yang ,
  • REN Wang ,
  • WU Renpu ,
  • WANG Weiping ,
  • YI Shengwei ,
  • HAN Baijing
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  • 1. China Information Technology Security Evaluation Center, Beijing 100085, China;
    2. School of Computer and Communication Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China;
    3. College of Electronics and Information Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China

Received date: 2020-07-09

  Online published: 2021-10-19

摘要

在工业4.0的时代背景下,信息物理系统(CPS)需要慎重考虑安全性、可控性问题。该文基于受到执行器攻击的信息物理系统模型,研究攻击检测与安全状态估计。针对攻击检测问题,设计了一种有限时间异常检测器,可确保系统受到的攻击在预设的有限时间之内被准确检测出来。在此基础上设计了一种观测器对系统的状态进行安全估计。理论分析表明,该观测器可以保证在检测到攻击时立即调整系统,确保系统达到一个安全稳定的状态。最后,通过实验仿真验证了所提方法的有效性。

本文引用格式

高洋 , 任望 , 吴润浦 , 王卫苹 , 伊胜伟 , 韩白静 . 信息物理系统的攻击检测与安全状态估计[J]. 清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2021 , 61(11) : 1234 -1239 . DOI: 10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2021.21.008

Abstract

In the Industry 4.0 context, cyber-physical systems (CPS) need effective security and control capabilities. This study analyzes attack detection and security state estimation based on a cyber-physical system model attacked by an actuator. The attack detection uses a finite time attack detector that ensures that existing attacks can be accurately detected within a preset time limit. An observer is then designed to estimate the system state. A theoretical analysis shows that the observer ensures that the system can immediately adjust when attacked and that the system will reach a safe, stable state. Simulations verify the effectiveness of this method.

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