与传统的设计-招标-建造（DBB）模式将设计与施工分阶段依序进行不同，工程总承包（EPC）模式因能充分发挥设计施工一体化的效用而受到工程界的推崇，业主在项目前期参与设计工作的深度成为EPC项目顺利有效实施的重要因素。该文基于博弈论针对EPC项目前期业主的设计深度对承包商优化设计决策的影响进行研究，并使用数值分析方法寻找适用性更强的双方最优策略。结果显示：随着优化设计的收益成本比的增加，深设计策略的适用性减弱，浅设计策略的适用性增强；深设计策略在收益成本比小于1.2时，存在一个确定的业主承担风险成本比例使得适用性最强，在收益成本比大于1.2时，适用性随着业主承担风险成本比例增加而增强；整体上，招标期业主提供浅设计且后期由承包商进行优化设计是优势策略。该文针对实际工程类型特征给出了有效运用EPC模式的实践建议。
The engineering-procurement-construction (EPC) method is frequently used in construction projects because this method integrates all aspects of design and construction into one process. This method differs from the design-bid-build(DBB)method in which the design and construction steps are sequential. An important factor for smooth and effective implementation of an EPC project is how involved is the owner early in the design process. This study used game theory to analyze the effects of the owner's level of involvement and the contractor's design optimization decisions in an EPC project with a numerical analysis of the more applicable two-sided optimization strategy for engineering practice. The results show that increasing the profit and cost ratio in the optimization process reduces the importance of the owner's level of involvement in the design process. For profit and cost ratios less than 1.2, the owner being heavily involved in the design has an optimal compatibility with a specific proportion of the risk assumed by the owner while for ratios greater than 1.2, the importance of the owner's level of involvement in the design process increases with increasing proportion of the risk assumed by the owner. Overall, the owner having limited involvement in the design with an design optimization by the contractor is the most advantageous strategy. Practical suggestions are given to help the industry better understand and more effectively use EPC.
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