Effect of local governments' land leasing behavior based on yardstick competition

LONG Fenjie; WANG Xiaomeng; ZOU Di

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Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology) ›› 2015, Vol. 55 ›› Issue (9) : 971-976,983.

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Effect of local governments' land leasing behavior based on yardstick competition

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Abstract

This study theoretically and empirically analyzes how a yardstick competition influences a local governments' land leasing behavior spatially for a Chinese particular land supply system. The ratio of the industrial land to total land supply is shown to be affected by other governments'decisions due to yardstick competition from “top” and “bottom” when mobility factors are included through tests of the horizontal externalities in the land supply in 177 prefecture-level cities. The result shows spatial autocorrelation between local governments and their competitors who rank near them in terms of the ratio of the industrial and residential to total land supply because of the yardstick competition from the “top”, with of significance at 0.1 percent. For yardstick competition from the “bottom”, the coefficient of the spatial lag variable for residential land is no longer significant while industrial land maintains its ability to attract factors like labor and capital.

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yardstick competition / land supply / interaction behavior / spatial econometric model

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LONG Fenjie, WANG Xiaomeng, ZOU Di. Effect of local governments' land leasing behavior based on yardstick competition[J]. Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology). 2015, 55(9): 971-976,983

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